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Abstract: 
This article examines two social justice theories, Rawlsian Justice and the Capabilities Approach of Sen 
and Nussbaum, in relation to congruence with four principles of spiritually sensitive social work. We find 
that although Rawlsian justice has valuable insights, it has some gaps for promoting spiritually sensitive 
practice. In contrast, the Capabilities Approach bears more promise for promoting spiritually sensitive 
social work as it meets all these ethical principles. Scholars could build on its insights to articulate a 
vision for spiritually sensitive social justice that can guide our profession’s approaches to macro practice 
and social policy. 
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Comparing Rawlsian Justice and the Capabilities Approach to Justice 
from a Spiritually Sensitive Social Work Perspective 
 
 The primary mission of social work is to enhance human wellbeing and to help meet the basic 
human needs of all people, with particular attention to the needs and empowerment of people who are 
vulnerable, oppressed, and living in poverty. Therefore, social work includes attention to matters of 
social policy and conceptions of social justice, as recognized in both American and international ethical 
principles (International Federation of Social Workers and International Association of Schools of Social 
Work [IFSW/IASSW], 2005; National Association of Social Workers [NASW], 2008). This mission becomes 
spiritually sensitive when it is attuned to people’s search for a sense of meaning, purpose, morality, and 
connectedness between themselves, the world, and transcendent or deeply profound levels of reality, 
and, when it is expressed through practice that respects the diverse religious or nonreligious spiritual 
perspectives and goals of clients and their communities (Canda & Furman, 2010; Derezotes, 2006; 
Sheridan, 2004, 2009). Although there are several discussions of principles for justice in relation to 
spirituality and religion in social work (e.g. Brenden, 2007; Canda & Furman, 2010; Cerny, 2004; Faver, 
2004; Hodge, 2011; Nash & Stewart, 2006), there is no detailed examination of social justice theories 
with regard to their relevance to spiritually sensitive social work.  
 In order to redress this gap, we examine two major theories of social justice: Rawlsian justice 
(Rawls, 1971, 1999, 2001) and the Capabilities Approach (Nussbaum, 2001, 2006; Sen, 1999, 2009). We 
have chosen them because Rawls is widely considered the most important social justice theorist of the 
20th century and is the most cited social justice theorist in social work, while the Capabilities Approach 
(CA) is an alternative with significant promise in promoting aspects of social justice envisioned by social 
work scholars (Banerjee, 2011; Morris, 2002; Pyles & Banerjee, 2010). Regarding CA, we focus on Sen’s 
capabilities perspective, given its thoroughness, international prominence, and recognition by his 
reception of the 1998 Nobel Prize for Economics; we complement Sen’s views with Nussbaum’s 
conception of capabilities. We present these two theories and then critique their strengths and 
weaknesses with special attention to their consistency with major principles of spiritually sensitive social 
work.  
 Four principles are drawn primarily from the comprehensive framework for spiritually sensitive 
social work developed by Canda and Furman (2010) and other social work scholars noted above. 
Following Canda and Furman’s usage of terms, spirituality as an aspect of individuals and groups refers 
to “A process of human life and development focusing on the search for a sense of meaning, purpose, 
morality, and well-being; in relationship with oneself, other people, other beings, the universe, and 
ultimate reality however understood…; orienting around centrally significant priorities; and engaging a 
sense of transcendence (experienced as deeply profound, sacred, or transpersonal)” (p. 75). People may 
express spirituality within religions (i.e., organized religious traditions and institutions) and also without 
them. Many people affiliate with religions that shape their spiritual perspectives and actions related to 
social justice. When we use the term spirituality, we include its religious and nonreligious expressions. 
Nonreligious spirituality refers to the ways individuals and communities pursue the above definitional 
themes (i.e. meaning, connectedness, central life priorities, and transcendence) outside of religions.  
 Supporting full human development. This principle of spiritually sensitive social work promotes 
social arrangements that allow actualization of the full developmental potential of individuals and 
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communities, including a sense of meaning in life, mutually fulfilling relationships, and transcendence of 
egoism, ethnocentrism, and other forms of harmful divisiveness. Maslow (1970) emphasized that 
societies should be arranged such that individuals who choose to extend their growth into self-
actualization and self-transcendence can be supported. Wilber (2000) described social and political 
values associated with a healthy vision-logic mode of consciousness that is holistic, recognizes planetary 
interconnectedness of all humans and all beings, and promotes governance that supports full human 
development and diversity of worldviews. Fowler’s (1981, 1996) representation of faith development 
suggested that the highest stage of universalizing faith involves nonjudgmental love and valuing for all 
people and beings and the ability to honor one’s own faith commitments while understanding and 
respecting other faith perspectives, thus promoting commitment to nonegoistic and nonethnocentric 
forms of justice. Derezotes (2005), Faver (2004), and Nash and Stewart (2005) emphasized the 
connection between the spiritual development of individuals (including raising consciousness and levels 
of empathy and caring beyond egocentrism and ethnocentrism) and the importance of societal 
arrangements that allow for such development. 
 Prioritizing the vulnerable. This principle places priority on work with and on behalf of 
vulnerable and oppressed individuals and groups of people, including those who are targets of negative 
discrimination due to their religious or nonreligious spiritual perspectives. Concern and social activism 
on behalf of poor and oppressed people is common in religious traditions, though their priorities and 
values can vary widely (Canda & Furman, 2010; Hodge, 2011; Zweig, 1991). This principle, common in 
empowerment approaches to social work (Robbins, Chatterjee, & Canda, 2012), is highlighted in 
Catholic social teaching and liberation theology’s priority on poor and oppressed people (Brenden & 
Spandl, 2007; Gutierrrez, 1973), and in the Gandhian social work value of sarvodaya, which means 
uplifting all and letting the benefits ripple to wider levels of society for the welfare of all (Walz & Ritchie, 
2000). 
 Addressing global/ecological interrelation. This principle considers the whole world’s 
human/planetary ecological interrelation by overcoming environmental racism, global socio-economic 
injustice, war, and the destruction of natural ecological systems. This principle was elaborated by Arne 
Naess (1988), the deep ecology philosopher, and applied to social work by Besthorn (2001), Coates 
(2007), and others. It resonates with ideals of ecofeminism (Besthorn & Pearson-McMillen, 2002), 
integral politics (Wilber, 2000, 2001), Indigenous approaches to social work (Gray, Coates, & Yellow Bird, 
2008), Buddhist social action (Macy, 1991; Pyles, 2005), and Christian conceptions of honoring nature as 
God’s creation (Canda, Ketchell, Dybicz, Pyles, & Nelson-Becker, 2006; Fox, 1979). 
 Respecting spiritual diversity. This principle requires professional social work activities to 
demonstrate respect for diverse religious and nonreligious expressions of spirituality among people and 
their communities (Canda & Furman, 2010; Sheridan, 2004, 2009). This principle is consistent with the 
NASW and IFSW/IASSW ethical principles of nondiscrimination on the basis of religion, and the United 
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
 
Rawlsian Social Justice  
 
Rawls’s Spiritual Background and Its Influence on His Conception of Justice 
John Rawls grew up and spent most of his life in New England. During his childhood and youth, 
he was an Episcopal Christian (Freeman, 2007; Pogge, 1994). His devotion to Christianity was evident in 
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his undergraduate senior thesis on the meaning of sin and faith. He criticized “naturalism… in which 
spiritual life is reduced to the level of desire and appetition…” (Rawls quoted in Gregory, 2007, p. 187), 
leading to excessive individualism and loss of sense of connection with community and God. He 
considered going into seminary. His youthful concern with matters of the meaning of life and proper 
human relationships endured into adulthood and shaped his theory of justice. However, his religious 
views took a significant turn away from Christianity. 
The turning point came during World War II (Freeman, 2007; Gregory, 2007; Pogge, 2007). 
When he graduated from Princeton, Rawls did military service for three years in New Guinea, the 
Philippines, and Japan. He specified three events that shattered his youthful faith. First, in 1944, in a 
combat situation, a Lutheran pastor preached that God aimed their bullets to hit the Japanese while 
protecting themselves from harm. Rawls was appalled at the wartime suffering around him and was 
angered that the pastor was giving a false view of divine providence in order to comfort the troops. 
Second, in 1945, a friend was killed in battle by Japanese combatants while he narrowly escaped. Third, 
he witnessed the aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima after learning about the horrible extent of the 
holocaust of Jews in Europe. He then questioned whether it made any sense to pray to a God for help 
who allowed millions of Jews to die at the hands of the Nazis and who seemed to selectively intervene in 
human affairs. He wondered at the sensibility of a Christian conception of God as a benevolent all 
powerful being who created the human species to be so corrupt as to engage in wars and atrocities. In 
his late life personal reflections, he wrote, “Those doctrines became impossible for me to take 
seriously… they depict God as a monster moved solely by God’s own power and glory. As if such 
miserable and distorted puppets as humans … could glorify anything!” (Rawls quoted in Freeman, 2007, 
p. 10). 
Rawls decided that morality does not need a god to justify it. Justice is justifiable by its 
compatibility with human good, orderly society, and progress toward a realistic utopia (Freeman, 2007). 
He rejected Christian pessimism about human nature (e.g., the doctrine of original sin) and instead 
relied on the ability of reasonable persons to bring their varied viewpoints into the public arena in a way 
that would lead to the wider good of society. However, he did not express hostility toward Christian 
theism or religion in general. He emphasized the importance of people, religious and secular, engaging 
in reasonable public discourse within a liberal democracy (Gregory, 2007). This attitude is consistent 
with a lifelong pattern of objections to incivility, from youthful dislike of what he believed were closed 
religious or secular systems of belief, to young adulthood abhorrence of atrocities in World War II, and 
into adulthood objection to the Vietnam War and to social injustice. The adult Rawls was concerned 
about spiritual matters of the meaning of human life, morality, and theodicy; but he was not religious or 
theistic. He hoped his views and procedures would promote distributive justice and make society 
egalitarian.  
 
Key Concepts in Rawlsian Justice 
Justice as fairness. The foundation of Rawls’s (1971, 1999, 2001) two principles of justice and his 
conception of distributive justice is fairness to all U.S. citizens. Fairness implies avoidance of bias or 
maintaining objectivity as Rawls and his putative representative citizens go about formulating what 
justice would look like in an ideal society. In his hypothetical “original position,” which is a situation of 
primordial equality between reasonable persons, the representative individuals involved in choosing the 
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principles of justice would have no knowledge of their personal identities, or their respective vested 
interests, within the group as a whole. From this “veil of ignorance” the representatives choose 
principles of justice that would apply to all citizens in an unbiased manner while attending to the 
interests and concerns of others. The chosen principles of justice would determine the “basic structure” 
or social institutions that would govern the ideal society.  
A basic question that Rawls addresses is how people can cooperate with each other in society 
despite subscribing to deeply opposed, though reasonable, comprehensive doctrines. This becomes 
possible when citizens share what he considered to be a reasonable political conception of justice. 
Despite diversities among members, Rawls states the representatives would arrive at one set of 
principles of justice fair to the entire group. In the first stage, the people choose the principles of justice. 
In the next stage, or the “constitutional stage,” the actual institutions are selected in line with the 
chosen principles of justice. The working of these institutions in turn leads to further social decisions at 
later stages as in the “legislative stage.” The imagined sequence moves forward step by step to 
completely just societal arrangements.  
Principles of justice. The first principle is known as the equal liberty principle and guarantees 
basic political and civil liberties such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, property ownership, and 
political participation to all. The second principle has two parts. In the 2001 version, the first part of the 
second principle is known as the fair equality of opportunity principle and it guarantees fair access to 
education and work for all citizens with equal ability and talent, irrespective of socio-economic 
background, gender, and race. The second part of the second principle is known as the difference 
principle, and it accepts some inequalities in social and economic institutions as fair, but requires 
inequalities benefit least advantaged citizens to the greatest extent possible. 
Primary goods. Rawls stated all citizens require five primary goods, which are “various social 
conditions and all-purpose means necessary and required to enable citizens to develop” (2001, p. 57). 
Earlier Rawls (1971; 1999) had distinguished between natural and social primary goods. He had 
emphasized that the five needs were social primary goods because they were within the purview of 
societal influence. These needs were basic rights and liberties; freedom of movement and free choice of 
occupation from diverse opportunities; powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority 
and responsibility; income and wealth; and social bases of self-respect. But, he had considered health, 
vigor, intelligence, and imagination as natural primary goods because they were not under the control of 
social institutions. He was criticized for making this distinction between natural and social primary 
goods. Consequently he dropped the term “social” from primary goods and referred to them only as 
primary goods (Rawls, 2001).  
Rawls stated, “All these primary goods are to be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage” (1999, p. 54). This critically 
important equality clause is missing in 2001. Rawls stipulated that the primary goods are “indexed” 
(2001, p. 59). This means that a ratio of shares would be created on the basis of citizens’ “appropriate 
contributions … to the good of others by training and educating their native endowments and putting 
them to work within a fair system of cooperation” (2001, p. 68). Thus, citizen’s index of primary goods 
could be low, medium or high based on the market value of their contributions. He changed the wording 
to emphasize incentive for work and productivity. 
Banerjee, M. M., and Canda, E. (2012). Comparing Rawlsian Justice and the Capabilities Approach to Justice from a Spiritually 
Sensitive Social Work Perspective. Special Issue, Spirituality and Social Justice, Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Social Work, 
31, (1-2), pp.9-31.  Publisher’s official version: < http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15426432.2012.647874> .  Open Access version:  
http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/. 
6 
 
Distributive justice. Briefly, distributive justice has two requirements: (a) citizens and 
institutions must cooperate, and (b) the government must regulate social, economic, and political 
institutions, and determine these institutions’ as well as citizens’ duties and obligations based on his two 
principles of justice. When these conditions are met, the benefits and burdens of social cooperation are 
fairly distributed among all citizens and distributive justice results. In the context of social work, social 
cooperation means wage labor for those who do not have the capital to invest and investment by those 
who have the capital. Labor and investment take place in a more or less free market economy. A more 
or less free market economy means the government should regulate it only to prevent the formation of 
monopolies that could fix prices; otherwise it should be allowed to run its course because of its 
efficiency to coordinate and its ability to stabilize demand and supply (Rawls, 1971, 1999, 2001).  
In this system, pay and benefits for wage earners are a pre-determined contract and tied to an 
individual’s ability, merit, effort, and contribution as well as what the market is willing to pay based on 
demand and supply. When people are more talented, and consequently in higher demand, they should 
be paid more than those who are less talented and more easily available. When people are unhappy 
with their wages they should enhance their educational and occupational skills to earn more. The 
government is not required to have a full employment policy, or to set a minimum wage standard 
because both these actions would interfere with the functioning of a free market economy.  
Citizens and least advantaged people. According to Rawls, citizens are people who are free, 
equal, normal, reasonable, rational, and willing to work together. Least advantaged people are those 
who have the least income and wealth (1971, 1999). In 2001, Rawls clarified that least advantaged 
people are those who have the lowest index of the five primary goods. Rawls (2001) softened his use of 
the term “least advantaged” by noting that the term “least advantaged” is not a rigid designator, rather 
it represents people who are worst off under a particular scheme of social functioning, but who might 
do well under a different system. Most importantly, they are not identifiable by gender, race, or 
nationality (2001, p. 59, note # 26). In other words, least advantaged people are any working poor 
citizens.  
Surfers and hard cases. Rawls classified non-working poor citizens into two groups: able bodied 
adults who are able but unwilling to work (“surfers”), and people with health issues (“hard cases”). 
Rawls did not support public assistance for people who do not work and stated “surfers must somehow 
support themselves” (2001, p. 179). He did not discuss people’s inability to work because he viewed all 
citizens as so-called “normal” working people. Rawls (1999) strictly restricted his discussion of justice to 
people whose physical and mental capacities were “within the normal range, so that questions of health 
care and mental capacity do not arise” (1999, pp. 83-84). In 2001 in a footnote Rawls stated we have to 
“duty” to help such people, but it cannot be covered under a political conception of justice, which is his 
revised conceptualization of social justice.  
Valid and invalid grounds for justice. Citizens have a valid claim to distributive justice only when 
they cooperate with the system by contributing their labor or capital or both to socio-economic 
productivity. But Rawls recognized that a free market economy may not always meet “claims of need” 
(1971, p. 277). A valid claim of need arises only when: (a) people cooperate with the economy and work, 
but fail to make a living wage, or (b) people are unable to work temporarily because of ill-health, or (c) 
people are unable to work because of seasonal or temporary nature of their jobs. Only under these 
three circumstances of conscientious effort is the government required to pay a “social minimum” or 
Banerjee, M. M., and Canda, E. (2012). Comparing Rawlsian Justice and the Capabilities Approach to Justice from a Spiritually 
Sensitive Social Work Perspective. Special Issue, Spirituality and Social Justice, Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Social Work, 
31, (1-2), pp.9-31.  Publisher’s official version: < http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15426432.2012.647874> .  Open Access version:  
http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/. 
7 
 
public assistance (1971, 1999, 2001). He did not address how much or what constitutes public 
assistance, but was clear that the social minimum should be less than the value of market wage to retain 
the incentive for work.  
Judgments about people’s moral worth, need, and allocative justice have no place in distributive 
justice. Rawls did not question deservingness or moral desert, but clarified, “moral desert as moral 
worth of character and actions cannot be incorporated into a political conception of justice in view of 
the fact of reasonable pluralism” (2001, p. 73). He stated “moral worth would be utterly impracticable 
as a criterion when applied to questions of distributive justice. … Only God could make those 
judgments” (2001, p. 73). Because of a lack of agreement on what is good character and behavior, there 
cannot be any agreement on the nature of moral worth.  
Rawls explained that allocative justice is concerned with the distribution of “a given collection of 
goods” which is to be “divided among definite individuals with known desires and needs,” and “the 
goods to be allotted are not produced by these individuals” (1971, p. 88). Rawls reasoned that because 
the collection of goods to be allocated is not “the product of these individuals,” they do not have any 
“prior claim” to the goods, and the collection of goods can be distributed according to need or desire 
(2001, p. 50). In his final thesis Rawls stated, “We reject the idea of allocative justice as incompatible 
with the fundamental idea by which justice as fairness is organized” (2001, p. 50).  
 
Evaluating Rawlsian Justice for Congruence with the Four Principles 
 Supporting full human development. Rawls’ conception of justice supports human 
development in that he supports equal basic liberties and fair opportunities, especially with regard to 
education and work. He recognizes primary goods that are essential for full human development 
(especially basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement and occupation, income, and self-respect) 
and he stipulates a requirement for civil manner of justice discourse to avoid violations of human rights. 
These ideas represent a move toward a spiritually sensitive social work perspective, but are inadequate 
to meet the full human developmental needs of the most vulnerable people. Further, Rawls does not 
articulate any possibilities or goals for fuller human developmental possibilities such as loving 
relationships, creativity, and self-transcendence. In fact, his allowance for indexing of primary goods, his 
discounting of so-called “surfers,” and the dismissal of so-called “hard cases” from his justice framework 
are incongruent with spiritually sensitive social work. 
 Prioritizing the vulnerable. Rawls demonstrates concern for the vulnerable by encouraging 
policies that promote egalitarianism (especially through promoting work and education) and by 
stipulating that inequalities should be for the benefit of the least advantaged. However, this concern is 
limited to the working poor. Those who are able but unwilling to work (surfers) and those with illnesses 
and disabilities that prevent work (hard cases) are relegated to a private sphere of voluntary care and 
excluded from his justice framework. Rawls’ concern for the working poor and the welfare of society 
generally is congruent with spiritually sensitive social work. However, the restriction of justice concern 
to the working poor is incongruent.  
 Addressing global/ecological interrelation. Rawls’s theory is oriented toward liberal 
democracies of the West, especially the U.S. In Rawls’s later work (i.e., The Law of Peoples, 1999), he 
acknowledges other countries and states that certain accommodations for more hierarchically arranged 
traditional societies are needed, but admits that his two principles of justice would not work there. For 
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international justice, Rawls calls for civility but does not offer anything more to deal with global 
injustices. Further, the global/ecological interrelationship and such matters as environmental justice are 
not considered at all. So this aspect of Rawlsian justice is weakly congruent with spiritually sensitive 
social work. 
 Respecting spiritual diversity. Rawls’ equal liberty principle specifies religious freedom. Rawls 
also makes an important contribution by emphasizing the need for civil discourse that does not privilege 
any particular religious or secular worldview, within, of course, his preference for a liberal and tolerant, 
open democracy. However, due to his insistence on civil discourse in the mode of rationality, the moral 
and emotional aspects of faith and compassion are neglected. Some critics argue that he is not 
sufficiently open to justice arguments on the basis of sincere religious commitment or spiritual 
experiences (Gregory, 2007; Yates, 2007). In this regard, Rawlsian justice is congruent with spiritually 
sensitive social work’s commitment to respecting spiritual diversity, but does not go far enough. 
 
The Capabilities Approach to Social Justice 
 
Sen’s Spiritual Background and its Influence on His Conception of Justice 
Welfare economist and political philosopher Amartya Sen (1992, 1999, 2009) arrives at a theory 
of social justice for all “in a very broad sense” (2009, p. ix) from a very different vantage point in relation 
to Rawls. Sen was born in 1933 and educated in India and in England (Cambridge, B.A. and Ph.D.). He has 
lived and taught in India, the United Kingdom, and the United States where he is currently a 
distinguished professor at Harvard University. He grew up through the time of British colonialism in 
India, the freedom movement, and subsequent interethnic and interreligious conflicts, as well as the 
growth of India into a major nation state.  
When he was 11 years old, he witnessed the killing of a poor Muslim man by Hindus in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh (at that time a part of India). As a child he was horrified that a man’s religious identity could 
be held against him, and that the man’s other identities, such as being a poor man who left home in 
search of work to feed his family despite his wife’s pleadings to not go out as rioting was going on, had 
no bearing on the mob’s decision to stab him (Sen 1999, 2009). Sen (2006) came to promote complex 
understandings of identity, including the intersections of a person’s or group’s religion (if any) and many 
other facets of affiliation. He is not supportive of overgeneralized characterizations of individuals or 
groups based on simplistic and stereotypical views of a person’s religion or any other characteristic. 
Sen draws on both Western (especially Adam Smith) and non-Western philosophies and 
intellectual histories, particularly from India, but also from elsewhere. He aims to clarify how to enhance 
justice and remove blatant injustices. He reports a major shift in his thinking about income and wealth 
as an economist by reflecting on comments by a woman scholar, Maitreyee, as reported in the 
Upanishads. During her discussions with her scholar husband she asked him: “If the whole earth, full of 
wealth” were to belong to her, could she achieve immortality with it? Learning that she could not, she 
remarked, “What should I do with that by which I do not become immortal?” (1999, p. 13). Reflection on 
this discourse led Sen to understand “the nature of the human predicament and the limitations of the 
material world” (1999, p. 13), so he shifted his focus from increasing a country’s GNP to other valuable 
ways of living. Sen draws a parallel to Maitreyee’s question by referring to Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
ethics, “wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of 
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something else” (2009, p. 253). Believing “justice cannot be indifferent to the lives that people can 
actually live” (2009, p. 18), Sen refers to Buddha, who was deeply concerned by the “sight of mortality, 
morbidity, and disability around him” (2009, p. 225).  
Because of his Indian background, Sen (2005) writes, “religion is not our only identity, nor 
necessarily the identity to which we attach the greatest importance” (p. 56). He clarifies in the extensive 
religious literature of India, doubt or skepticism is expressed about creation. To illustrate, Sen cites the 
Rigveda: “Who really knows? Who will here proclaim it? Whence was it produced? Whence is this 
creation? … perhaps it formed itself, or perhaps it did not – the one who looks down on it, in the highest 
heaven, only he knows – or perhaps he does not know” (p. xi). Sen (2006) is not religious, though he is 
interested in matters of spirituality as we define it.  
Instead of trying to get to ideal justice, Sen seeks to “merely” expand justice. Sen (2009) draws 
on the Magna Carta’s idea, “To no man (sic) will we sell, or deny, or delay, right or justice” (p. 73). He 
also draws on the classical Sanskrit ideas of niti and nyaya, both of which stand for justice. Niti refers to 
rules and regulations and behavioral correctness in society; nyaya stands for a comprehensive 
conception of realized justice, or how people actually live in society. Sen (1999, p. 73) examines “the 
actual living that people manage to achieve” to assess the extent of justice. He asks: what are people 
able to do and be? What freedoms or opportunities do people have to develop capabilities that allow 
them to lead a dignified life of their own choice?  
 
Key Concepts in Sen’s Capabilities Approach (CA) 
The key idea in CA is that social arrangements should aim to expand people’s capabilities, or 
their freedoms and opportunities to promote or achieve valuable beings and doings. Three core ideas 
are associated with CA: functionings, capabilities, and agency.  
Functionings. Functionings are valuable activities that make up people’s living and wellbeing, 
such as being healthy, safe, educated, or having the ability to participate in public discussions. 
Functionings are related to goods and income, but they describe what a person is able to do or be as a 
result of them. Because functionings are aspects of human wellbeing, some functionings may be basic 
(e.g., being nourished, literate, or clothed), and other functionings may be complex, (e.g., being able to 
appear in public without shame). Functionings can be general (e.g., ability to be employed) or specific 
(e.g., ability to be the President of the U.S.). Functionings relate to various dimensions of wellbeing and 
range from survival, relationships and self-direction, to arts and culture.  
Capabilities. Sen (1999; 2009) states capabilities are “the various combinations of functionings 
(beings and doings) that a person can achieve. Thus, Capability is a set of vectors of functionings, 
reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another … to choose from possible livings” 
(1992, p. 40). In other words, capabilities are opportunity freedoms to be or to do what individuals value 
as worthwhile. For example, just as people with a lot of money can buy various goods, similarly, people 
with many capabilities can enjoy many activities and pursue varied life paths. Thus, capabilities imply a 
possibility or opportunity for functioning, but not specific functionings, because in CA people are agents 
who choose how to function.  
Agency. Sen (1999, 2009) explains the idea of agency by noting the difference between fasting 
and starving. A person who is fasting is choosing not to eat because of political, religious, or health 
considerations. However, a person who is starving is not doing so out of choice, but rather is unable to 
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eat because of lack of food resources. The difference is that the fasting person could eat and chooses 
not to; whereas the starving person would eat if she could. So, agency refers to people’s ability to 
pursue and realize goals they value and have reason to value. An agent is someone who acts and brings 
about change. An agent is not someone who is forced, oppressed, or passive. Moreover, agency can 
expand the horizons of concern beyond a person’s own wellbeing to include environmental concerns, 
such as saving the spotted owl or helping people become free, such as Gandhi, M. L. King, Mandela, or 
Aung San Suu Kyi. Furthermore, along with the power of capabilities comes the obligation to help others 
(Sen, 2009). Thus, CA views people as active, creative, and able to act on behalf of their aspirations. 
Instrumental freedoms. Sen (1999, 2009) focuses on five types of instrumental freedoms that 
enhance individuals’ capabilities to lead a life that is valuable to them. Political freedoms focus on civil 
rights, including religious freedom, and cover opportunities for dialogue, dissent, and critique as well as 
voting rights and participatory selection of legislators and executives. Economic facilities refer to 
opportunities to utilize economic resources for consumption, production, or exchange with particular 
attention to availability and access to financial credit. Social opportunities refer to arrangements that 
society makes for education and health care so that all people can effectively participate in life. 
Transparency guarantees address the need for openness in relating to others under assurances of 
disclosure so that corruption, financial irresponsibility, and underhand dealings are prevented. 
Importantly for social workers, Sen strongly promotes protective security emphasizing the need for a 
social security net to prevent people from being reduced to abject poverty through the provision of 
unemployment benefit, supplementary income benefits, as well as ad hoc arrangements for relief or 
emergency public employment to generate income. Sen believes that these instrumental freedoms 
directly enhance people’s capabilities, as well as supplement and reinforce one another. 
Substantive freedoms. Sen identifies a broad range of substantive freedoms which range from 
being able to avoid “starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality, as 
well as the freedoms … with being literate and numerate, enjoying political participation, and 
uncensored speech and so on (1999, p. 36). Sen (2009) believes when people have opportunities for 
healthcare and education, other opportunities open up for them.  
Diversities. Sen has a nuanced understanding of diversities relating to human, social, and 
environmental factors that affect capabilities. His examples include, a pregnant woman needs more 
nutrition than a non-pregnant woman; older adults have special needs; people living in certain 
environments are more prone to diseases and infections than others; cold or warm climates require 
more resources for heating or cooling (Sen, 1999, 2009). Consequently, he believes we cannot arbitrarily 
set a list of basic capabilities that all human beings need, nor set a poverty line that will work uniformly 
for all people. In fact, a person with a disability may have more income than others, but due to a 
“conversion handicap” may need more resources as some disabilities may not be entirely correctable 
even with huge expenditures on treatment or prosthesis. Sen (2009) notes, individual and their needs - 
irrespective of differences - matter, and a just society is one that allows each individual to meet his/her 
unique needs.  
Sen discusses intersectionalities of diversities among humans. He states, “A person belongs to 
many different groups (related to gender, class, language group, profession, nationality, community, 
race, religion, sexual orientation and so on) and to see them merely as a member of just one particular 
group would be a major denial of the freedom of each person to decide how exactly to see himself or 
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herself” (2009, pp. 246-247). He discloses, “I can be, at the same time, an Asian, an Indian citizen, … an 
American or British resident, an economist, a dabbler in philosophy, an author, a Sanskritist, a strong 
believer in secularism and democracy, a man, a feminist, a heterosexual, a defender of gay and lesbian 
rights, with a nonreligious lifestyle, from a Hindu background, a non-Brahmin, and a nonbeliever in an 
afterlife (and also, in case the question is asked, a non-believer in a “before-life”). This is just a small 
sample of diverse categories to each of which I may simultaneously belong—there are of course a great 
many other membership categories too, which depending on circumstances, can move and engage me” 
(2006, p. 19).  
Health. Sen notes that some capabilities are “natural goods,” which means luck, genes, or socio-
economic status at birth can play a role in their endowment. Thus, one’s physical and emotional health 
to some extent can be determined by luck factors or genetic conditions. Therefore, irrespective of 
natural or social origin of health, the government should provide the social bases by making health care 
available to all. . 
Poverty and women’s issues. Sen emphasizes the life circumstances of economically 
disadvantaged people and oppressed women in some patriarchal societies. He discusses “coupling of 
disadvantages” of various sorts and notes that “relative deprivation in income can yield absolute 
deprivation of capabilities” (1999, p. 6). There are “adaptive preferences” when disadvantaged people 
lower and adapt their expectations and life styles to what is feasible for them. Sen (2009) promotes 
women’s voice in the development agenda, focusing on a girl child’s education, reproductive rights, and 
access to micro-credit for women in developing countries. Sen acknowledges that cultural differences 
and diversity of human values are significant. Consequently, addressing capabilities via policies and 
programs may appear paternalistic. However, he notes although there are certain cultural norms that 
may contradict some values, such as women’s freedom to choose how to live, it is important to examine 
whether these cultural norms benefit or harm group members. While context shapes choice and 
aspirations, basic capabilities and aspirations exist across differences. Sen (2009) states that democratic 
discussion is a good vehicle for empowering oppressed people. Discussion allows people to understand 
other possibilities. He notes that certain prior conditions in legal, political, social, and economic spheres 
need to be created so that people can become capable of human flourishing.  
CA’s aim is to expand opportunities and freedoms for all so that each individual can lead a life of 
their own choosing. In Sen’s view, it is erroneous to focus only on income in poverty and justice analysis 
because although income is an important indicator of what people can and cannot do in their lives, 
increasing income should not be the ultimate aim of social policy, as true human living is much more 
than merely making money and adding to a country’s GNP. Sen clarifies that CA is greater than human 
capital theory, which focuses only on enhancing education and income generating power of people. Sen 
emphasizes human flourishing and gives low priority to income in relation to other capabilities that 
make a full life possible.  
 
Insights from Nussbaum about Capabilities 
Martha Nussbaum (1995, 2001, 2006) is a leading CA theorist and her ideas complement Sen’s 
ideas. Nussbaum and Sen agree on many points, including the importance of supporting people’s 
capabilities within a justice framework. They agree that people incapable of minimal functioning at one 
point in time can acquire or develop the requisite capabilities over time with appropriate public 
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arrangements. They also agree that capabilities are inter-related and affect one another. The main 
differences between Sen and Nussbaum lie in their identification of capabilities (referred to as 
substantive freedoms by Sen and as core capabilities by Nussbaum), and in a threshold level of 
capabilities discussed by Nussbaum but not by Sen.  
Nussbaum (1995, 2001, 2006) goes beyond Sen’s capability space. She articulates ten core 
capabilities that all individuals in all societies must have to lead a worthy or dignified life, based on field 
work with non-governmental organizations in India and cross-cultural discussions with Europeans. These 
core capabilities are: life (i.e., to live to the end of a normal human life span); bodily health (e.g., physical 
health, adequate nourishment, and shelter); bodily integrity (e.g., freedom of movement and security 
against assault, including domestic violence); senses, imagination and thought (e.g., using all these 
faculties informed by adequate education, engaging in free self-expression, having freedom of religious 
exercise and choice of how to explore the ultimate meaning of life); emotions (e.g., attachment to things 
and people, and the ability to experience a full range of emotions); practical reason (i.e., reflecting on 
the nature of the good, planning, and making choices about one’s life); affiliation (e.g., to live with and 
towards others on the basis of empathy and concern for justice, based on treatment as a dignified 
human being free of discrimination); concern for other species, (e.g., animals, plants, and the world of 
nature); play (i.e., to laugh, play, and enjoy recreation); and control over one’s political and material 
environment (e.g., free political choices and participation along with equal rights to property and 
seeking employment). Nussbaum states that a full human being is one who is dignified, free, shapes her 
own life, co-operates and reciprocates, uses practical reasoning, and has self-worth. Nussbaum 
identifies practical reason and affiliation as “architectonic capabilities” (2006, p. 162) that pervade all 
other capabilities.  
Nussbaum calls for a threshold level of each of the ten capabilities so that each person can then 
decide which capability to emphasize and how to function. She  notes, “If people are systematically 
falling below the threshold in any of these core areas, this should be seen as a situation both unjust and 
tragic, in need of urgent attention—even if in other respects things are going well (2001, p. 71). She 
states when citizens lack the core capabilities, they are capability deprived. She notes that women tend 
to suffer from acute capabilities deprivation. Thus, all societies should aim to get capability deprived 
people above a minimal capability threshold so that they can lead a dignified life of their own choice. 
Her universal and normative capabilities list allows comparisons of quality of life among people or how 
one is doing in relation to others in a society as well as cross-societal comparisons. 
Sen (2009) does not endorse Nussbaum’s list of core capabilities, or her belief that individuals 
must achieve a threshold level in each of the core capabilities, because these assumptions violate 
human freedom to choose. He believes his loose and broad substantive capabilities along with his list of 
instrumental capabilities deserve societal attention, and he leaves individuals to decide which 
capabilities they choose to enhance or neglect, as we cannot know the limits of human possibilities.  
 
Evaluating the Capabilities Approach to Justice for Congruence with the Four Principles 
Supporting full human development. Sen recognizes a wide range of human functionings that 
should be supported by justice frameworks. He acknowledges the importance of goods and income, but 
emphasizes that they are mere means to ends (i.e., people choosing and actualizing their own goals). He 
recognizes both basic (e.g., nourishment and shelter) and complex functionings that go beyond survival 
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to satisfying relationships, self-direction, and engagement with arts and culture. He supports capabilities 
as possibilities for choice among various life paths. He admires people’s achievement of free agency and 
concern for others, national and international human rights, and environmental protection. Nussbaum’s 
elaboration of core capabilities emphasizes the importance of everyone having the opportunity to 
equally achieve fulfillment of needs for survival, respectful affiliations, and a holistic blend of thinking, 
practical reason, emotions, senses, imagination, and other faculties. Sen’s ideal implies a wide range of 
capabilities, but in the interest of avoiding assuming what is important to particular persons and 
societies and in order to promote freedom of choice, he does not itemize the capabilities.  
CA thoroughly addresses justice issues related to what Maslow (1969; 1970) referred to as 
subsistence needs and self-actualization needs of freedom, creativity, and loving relationships. CA also 
implies the possibility of people choosing to pursue to further development of what Maslow called self-
transcendence needs, such as expanded states of consciousness, widely encompassing altruism, and 
sense of communion with the divine or oneness with the universe. This focus on basic needs, self-
actualization, and the potential for self-transcendence is congruent with spiritually sensitive social work. 
Prioritizing the vulnerable. CA supports freedoms for all people in a broad sense. Sen includes 
consideration of protections for the most vulnerable, such as through access to education and 
healthcare, maintenance of a social security net, and ad hoc programs to assist as needs arise. Sen and 
Nussbaum place strong emphasis on issues of poverty, oppression of women, and the full range of 
human diversities and intersectionalities of diverse characteristics as individuals choose to identify 
them. They do not restrict their justice concerns only to people who work. They include children, 
women, elderly, and people with disabilities. Nussbaum (2001) even includes other species, such as 
animals, plants, and the world of nature. She (2006) discusses in detail the protection of non-human 
animals’ capabilities and habitat. Overall, this discussion is highly congruent with this principle of 
spiritually sensitive social work. 
Addressing global/ecological interrelation. Given the highly international nature of Sen and 
Nussbaum’s experiences, it is not surprising that they address international issues to a significant 
degree, in the context of respectful affiliations, as Nussbaum describes it, and agency to choose 
functionings, as Sen puts it. They highlight the importance of shaping justice conceptions and social 
policies to be culturally appropriate in relation to particular communities and nations. They also 
recognize the importance of addressing protection of the natural environment and Nussbaum highlights 
the value of respectful affiliation with nonhuman beings and nature. These values are highly congruent 
with spiritually sensitive social work. 
From Nussbaum’s (2006) discussion of a safety net for animals and nature, she extends her 
understanding of capabilities much beyond Sen. However, there is insufficient discussion on ecological 
balance. It is unclear whether CA encompasses spiritually sensitive social work’s deep ecological 
awareness that respects nature and all beings and promotes wellbeing of nonhuman beings and the 
earth based on their intrinsic worth (Besthorn, 2001; Coates, 2007).  
Respecting spiritual diversity. CA places great importance on human freedoms, including 
respect for diverse religious and nonreligious worldviews and support for people’s freedom of (and 
freedom from) religion. Respectful discourse and dissent based on various religious and secular 
positions are supported in the CA framework. Violence perpetrated in the name of religion or secular 
ideologies is not supported. Further, CA takes a holistic view of human functioning and does not attempt 
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to limit justice discourse to reason. Sen’s discussion of justice takes into account insights from many 
different religious and philosophical positions. These commitments of CA are highly congruent with 
spiritually sensitive social work. 
Discussion 
 
A Comparison of Rawlsian Justice and the Capabilities Approach 
Rawls develops his theory of social justice based on the notion of “social contract” among 
hypothetical individuals to create an ideal society. Sen develops his theory of justice based on the notion 
of “impartial spectator” from real life examples both past and present for current life realities. Both 
social contract theories and impartial spectator premises have drawbacks due to an unrealistic portrayal 
of justice discourse. Yet, Rawls is more parochial than Sen in terms of the range of philosophical, 
cultural, and global perspectives used. Rawls focuses on income and wealth or goods and resources to 
bring about justice while Sen views income and wealth merely as a means to justice. Sen emphasizes 
that the actual freedoms or capabilities that people have affect the actual lives that people are able to 
lead and, as such, the ends of justice. Sen’s differentiation of niti and nyaya helps to demonstrate the 
stark contrast between procedural justice promoted by Rawls, and his own notion of realized justice in 
CA. Sen acknowledges income and wealth are important to wellbeing and quality of life, but notes that 
there is no country in the world that is happier because of its greater GNP. He asserts wellbeing and 
happiness result from achievements; what people are able to do and be. CA highlights that 
achievements are related to freedoms of people to choose and enact capabilities.  
Unlike Rawls, CA keeps health disadvantages, educational deficits, various personal, social, 
economic, and environmental diversities, environmental sustainability, and global justice within the 
scope of justice. Thus, Sen’s CA has a much wider range than Rawlsian justice, which excludes many of 
these elements and is restricted primarily to the U.S. and only for its citizens.  
Nussbaum believes each of the 10 capabilities is equally important and seeks a threshold level of 
each capability. While we concur with Sen’s cautions, we believe that Nussbaum’s elaboration of the 
range of capabilities helps social workers to think about how to identify and develop awareness of 
capabilities for spiritually sensitive social work. Yet Sen appears to be consistent with the social work 
value of self-determination in stating we cannot decide how people should lead their lives or place equal 
weight on each of Nussbaum’s identified capabilities. Sen emphasizes that it is important to have 
democratic discussion and through such discussion it is possible to empower people to believe that 
many capability options can be viable for them. He distinguishes between patients or clients and agents, 
and states that agents are people whose freedom to decide what to value and how to pursue what they 
value can extend far beyond what outsiders think is possible for them. Overall, CA’s stance on 
capabilities allows social workers to enhance social justice in a spiritually sensitive manner because it 
retains strong respect for human dignity, self-determination, and diversities.   
The previous comparison of Rawls and CA with regard to four principles of spiritually sensitive 
social work shows that both justice theories are concerned with societal arrangements to support 
human development, to address vulnerable people, and to respect diversity. Both Rawls and Sen were 
motivated to develop social justice theories by witnessing violence committed due to religious and other 
kinds of conflict. This led them to encourage respectful and nonviolent interchange of religious and 
nonreligious views in particular societies and in international relations. These features of the theories 
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are congruent with spiritually sensitive social work. Rawls has already made a major impact on thinking 
about social justice in social work, while CA is less well-known.  
However, Rawls’ theory is weaker than CA in its conception of human potential and in 
elaboration of various capabilities. Rawlsian justice promotes concern for the vulnerable only with 
regard to the working poor, while CA encompasses everyone and gives special consideration to poor, 
oppressed, and marginalized people. Rawls did not develop a thorough international vantage point on 
justice and neglected the global/ecological interrelationship. In contrast, CA pays attention to cultural 
and religious appropriateness of justice policies and practices, and encourages global justice and natural 
environmental protection.  
Rawls and CA agree diversity of religious and nonreligious worldviews should be respected and 
cooperative discourse between them should be encouraged within societies and the world. However, 
Rawls excludes explicit use of religious rationales in justice discourse and engagement of any other 
faculty than detached reasoning. CA includes religious and secular discourse about justice and also 
recognizes it is important for people to engage all their faculties of thinking, feeling, sensing, 
imagination, creativity, and mutually respectful affiliations. 
As a result of this comparison, we conclude that CA to justice is more congruent with social 
work’s mission and values in general and with the four principles of spiritually sensitive social work 
identified here. It is valuable for spiritually sensitive social workers to be familiar with Rawls’s 
foundational contributions to justice theory, because of its influence on our profession and wider 
political discourse. However, we believe that CA is a more comprehensive and congruent justice theory 
for spiritually sensitive social work. Scholars, educators, and practitioners engaged with spiritually 
sensitive social work could build on the insights of CA to articulate a vision for social justice that can 
guide our profession’s approaches to macro practice and social policy. This would also require a more 
detailed examination of CA regarding its possible strengths and limitations regarding the degree of its 
articulation of the full possibilities of human development (including the self-transcendence needs and 
transpersonal levels of consciousness) and a fully nature-respecting stance such as addressed by deep 
ecology.  
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